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mJ 
e the impact of the first 14 months of the state's 
1993 community notification statute. Even before this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In the single assault incident, a registrant was "punched in the nose 
when he answered his door." Sheila Donnelly & Roxanne Lieb, 
Washington's Community Notification Law: A Survey of Law Enforcement 
7 (Dec. 1993). 
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statute, probation and parole officers with a sex offender 
under supervision had provided notification to"local police; 
immediate and extended family members in contact with 
the offender; victims; other residents in the offender's 
home; regular visitors to the home; employers; therapists; 
Children's Services Division; landlords and apartment 
managers; ministers, pastors, and other officials where the 
offender attends church; select neighbors; specific 
business[es] frequented by the offender; and close 
associates to the offender." Oregon Dep't of Corrections, Sex 
Offender Community Notification in Oregon at 7 (Jan. 
1995). This practice continued after enactment of the 
statute requiring notification to "a broader public." As of 
the time of the study, there had been 237 notification plans 
submitted under the new law. In this context, the Oregon 
Department of Corrections reported as follows: 
 
In January 1995, forty-five parole/probation sex 
offender specialists from thirty-five counties responded 
to a survey of their experience with Community 
Notification. These officers were responsible for a total 
caseload of 2,160 sex offenders. The following 
information was gained from the surveys and [Sex 
Offender Supervision] Network discussions: 
 
*  *  * 
 
Less than 10% of offenders experienced some form of 
harassment. Incidents reported included name 
calling, graffiti, toilet papering and minor property 
vandalism, monitoring of a home by video camera, 
repeated reports of unfounded violations to parole/ 
probation officers, and picketing of residences. 
 
There were two extreme cases of retaliation. One sex 
offender had a gun pointed at him and was 
threatened. In another case, a victim had tires 
slashed and the offender was blamed. Although the 
offender passed a polygraph and was accountable for 
the time, there were threats made that the offender's 
home would be burned down. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Other circumstances reported by parole/probation 
officers included: 
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Community notification has made it more difficult to 
find residences for some sex offenders released from 
prison. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Notification has [affected] employment opportunities 
for sex offenders. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Businesses who were initially willing quietly to 
employ a sex offender sometimes do not provide jobs 
when the hiring will clearly become public. 
 
Id. at 12-14. 
 
IV. THE ROOKER-FELDMAN ISSUE 
 
There is a threshold jurisdictional issue for decision. The 
appellants contend that the district court was without 
subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Section 1257 of Title 28 
of the United States Code bestows upon the Supreme Court 
of the United States appellate jurisdiction to review final 
judgments of the highest courts of the respective states. 
The so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine teaches that, by 
negative implication, the inferior federal courts lack subject 
matter jurisdiction to review judgments of those courts. We 
have interpreted the doctrine to encompass final decisions 
of lower state courts as well. See Port Auth. Police 
Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 973 F.2d 
169, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Appellants point out that E.B. demanded and received 
judicial review of the prosecutor's Tier 3 classification and 
notification plan and that he advanced federal 
constitutional arguments in that proceeding for preventing 
the classification and notification plan from being put into 
effect. See Tr. Megan's Law Hearing (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. Dec. 7, 1995) at 6-9. The Superior Court, Law Division, 
after a hearing, rejected E.B.'s challenge and ordered that 
notification be given. E.B. appealed to the Appellate 
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Division, which affirmed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
thereafter denied E.B.'s petition for certification of appeal. 
As appellants stress, the relief E.B. seeks in this proceeding 
is an injunction directing that the notification ordered by 
the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, not be carried 
out. 
 
We agree with appellants that this is a paradigm 
situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal 
district court from proceeding. To grant E.B. relief would 
require an inferior federal court to determine that the New 
Jersey court's judgment was erroneous and would foreclose 
implementation of that judgment. See FOCUS v. Allegheny 
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
The district court reached a contrary conclusion because 
it believed that although E.B. raised constitutional issues, 
he "was denied an opportunity to meaningfully raise 
constitutional challenges to Megan's Law." 914 F. Supp. at 
89 (emphasis supplied). Its belief was based primarily on 
the fact that the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Doe had 
described a Megan's Law proceeding in the trial court as a 
"summary proceeding" and had stated that "the only issue 
for the court on the Tier level of notification is the risk of 
reoffense." Id. at 89-90; Doe, 662 A.2d at 382-83. This 
suggested to the district court that the New Jersey courts 
do not consider constitutional challenges in a Megan's Law 
proceeding. 914 F. Supp. at 90. 
 
If we shared the belief of the district court that E.B.'s 
constitutional challenges were not considered by the New 
Jersey courts--and, under Doe, could not be considered by 
them--we would also conclude that Rooker-Feldman did not 
deprive the district court of jurisdiction. However, we do not 
read the Doe opinion as instructing New Jersey courts to 
ignore properly raised claims based on the federal  
Constitution,9 and it is clear that the New Jersey courts do 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Consideration of constitutional issues is not inconsistent with the 
expectation of the Doe Court that Megan's Law proceedings in the trial 
court will be summary in nature. Once the constitutional issues raised 
by that law are authoritatively resolved, they will no longer be a 
component of the routine process. 
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not so read that opinion. In In re G.B., 669 A.2d 303, 306 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), aff'd, 685 A.2d at 1252, 
the Appellate Division considered constitutional challenges 
and rejected them on the merits because these same issues 
had been previously considered and rejected in Doe. Shortly 
thereafter, the Superior and Supreme Courts of New Jersey, 
in appeals from a denial of relief in a Megan's Law 
proceeding, addressed constitutional challenges to Megan's 
Law for which there was no binding precedent. See In re 
C.A., 679 A.2d at 1153. Even if there were not this clear 
evidence, however, we would have to "assume that state 
procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence 
of unambiguous authority to the contrary." Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). 
 
The only remaining issue with respect to E.B. and the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is whether a litigant can be said to 
have a meaningful opportunity to raise an issue in a state 
proceeding when the highest court of that state has 
rejected, in another litigant's case, the same argument the 
litigant wishes to raise. Our answer is in the affirmative. 
 
Rooker-Feldman abstention is necessary to preserve the 
United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction--as 
well as to limit federal court review of state court decisions 
to the avenue provided for such by Congress. See Ernst v. 
Child and Youth Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 
491 (3d Cir. 1997). The federal court structure established 
by Congress intends that only the Supreme Court have the 
opportunity to decide that a state court has reached an 
erroneous conclusion on a federal constitutional claim. 
Nothing suggests that this structure should be altered 
where the state court's decision is based upon what is 
already settled precedent in that state. 
 
As we have previously observed, the interests served by 
Rooker-Feldman are quite similar to those served by giving 
a state court judgment res judicata effect in a subsequent 
federal proceeding. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885-86 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1994); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 297 
(3d Cir. 1992). If a litigant resorts to a state court and 
suffers an adverse judgment, a lower federal court must 
respect that judgment unless and until it is overturned. The 
litigant's only remedy is by way of appeal through the state 
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court system and by way of petition to the Supreme Court 
of the United States thereafter.10 
 
We will, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the district 
court in E.B.'s case11 and remand with instructions to 
dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
This does not mean, however, that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction over the class claims in W.P . As we 
concluded in Valenti, 962 F.2d at 298, " Rooker-Feldman 
does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons 
not parties to earlier state court litigation." In W.P., at least 
some of the representative plaintiffs were not the subject of 
any kind of judicial order when they filed this suit to secure 
injunctive relief against enforcement of Megan's Law. 
Indeed, neither they nor the state had petitioned any state 
court for any relief. The claims of these class plaintiffs were 




10. Where, as here, the state Supreme Court exercises its discretion 
against review, certiorari will lie from the intermediate appellate court to 
the Supreme Court of the United States. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. 
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 678 n.1 (1968); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. 
v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 160 (1954). 
 
11. We note that E.B. does not seek to enjoin future proceedings against 
him under Megan's Law. Cf. Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430 (3d 
Cir. 1989). Rather he seeks relief from a judicial judgment in a Megan's 
Law proceeding that has already terminated. See Valenti, 962 F.2d at 
297. 
 
12. As with standing, which also "goes to the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the . . . court," Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 1986), 
jurisdiction over the claims of a single representative plaintiff allows a 
court to reach the class claims. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03 
(1975); see generally Wright & Miller, 7A Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1755 (noting that rule authorizing class actions cannot be construed to 
broaden or limit subject matter jurisdiction of district courts). 
 
13. In the district court, the Attorney General asked that W.P. be 
dismissed on grounds of Younger abstention. The district court rejected 
that contention before entering its preliminary injunction. Although 
Younger abstention was raised again in the Attorney General's 
interlocutory appeal from the preliminary injunction, that appeal was 
withdrawn when the district court entered summary judgment for the 
defendants. In the appeal now before us, the Attorney General does not 
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V. THE EX POST FACTO AND DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY ISSUES 
 
The Ex Post Facto Clause forecloses retroactive 
application of a law that "inflicts a greater punishment, 
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). The Double 
Jeopardy Clause forbids "multiple punishments for the 
same offense." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 
(1989). Accordingly, neither clause is implicated unless the 
state has inflicted "punishment." Since no one here 
suggests that "punishment" has a different meaning under 
one of these clauses than under the other, the critical issue 
to which we now turn is whether the notification called for 
in situations involving Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants is 
"punishment" for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double 
Jeopardy Clauses. 
 
A. The Artway Standard 
 
In Artway, when we addressed the issue of whether 
registration under Megan's Law constituted "punishment," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ask us to abstain from adjudicating the plaintiffs' constitutional claims; 
he asks rather that we affirm the district court's adjudication of those 
claims in his favor. We have no occasion to review the district court's 
disposition of the Younger abstention issues because the "State 
voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum." Ohio Bureau of 
Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977). 
 
The Sussex County prosecutor, also a defendant in W.P., urges in his 
brief that the district court erred in failing to abstain but does not ask 
us to remand with instructions to dismiss. Rather, he asks us to affirm 
the judgment in his favor if we agree with the district court and to 
abstain and "remit the named plaintiffs to the state courts" if we do not. 
Appellee-Dennis O'Leary's Br. at 41. Thus, the Sussex County prosecutor 
also "voluntarily chooses" to submit to this court's jurisdiction. Hodory, 
431 U.S. at 480. Moreover, to the extent that he purports to adopt a 
contrary position to that asserted by New Jersey's Attorney General, we 
do not believe that he is entitled to do so. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 468 U.S. 491, 500 n.9 (1984) 
(notwithstanding the objection of the New Jersey Casino Commission, 
because "the State's Attorney General has . . . agreed to our adjudication 
of the controversy, considerations of comity are not implicated, and we 
need not address the merits of the Younger abstention claim."). 
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we found no Supreme Court precedent addressing a similar 
statutory provision. In order to "divine" a"test for 
punishment," we reviewed the Supreme Court case law and 
looked for common considerations. 81 F.3d at 1254-63. 
Recognizing "that the appropriate `punishment' analysis 
depends on the context," we derived an "analytical 
framework for this case." Id. at 1261, 1263. Specifically, we 
concluded that a "measure must pass a three-prong 
analysis--(1) actual purpose, (2) objective purpose, and (3) 
effect--to constitute non-punishment." Id. at 1263. 
 
Under this Artway analysis, we first look to whether the 
adverse effect on individuals results from a desire on the 
part of the legislature to punish past conduct or is a by- 
product of a bona fide legislative effort to remedy a 
perceived societal problem. "If the legislature intended 
Megan's Law to be `punishment,' i.e. retribution was one of 
its actual purposes, then it must fail constitutional 
scrutiny. If, on the other hand, `the restriction of the 
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a 
regulation,' the measure will pass this first prong." Id. 
(quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). 
 
The second inquiry--into "objective purpose"--focuses on 
the operation of the legislative measure and on whether 
analogous measures have traditionally been regarded in our 
society as punishment. In Artway, we suggested that there 
were three aspects of "objective purpose" that should be 
considered by a court before deciding whether the party 
challenging the statute has carried its burden of showing 
that an objective observer in our society would perceive the 
measure as punitive. Id. It is important to consider the 
measure's proportionality--whether the remedial purpose of 
a legislative measure purporting to be non-punitive can 
explain all the adverse effects on those involved. While it is 
true that "even remedial sanctions carry the sting of 
punishment," id. at 1260 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), only if the sting is not "reasonably related" to the 
remedial goal would an objective observer be justified in 
perceiving a punitive purpose, id. at 1265. It is also 
important to consider history. If analogous measures have 
traditionally been regarded by our society as "serv[ing] 
punitive purposes" and the text and the legislative history 
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do "not make [the legislature's] plausible remedial purposes 
clear," id. at 1257, there is an objective basis for regarding 
the measure as punishment. Finally, we noted in Artway 
that some measures are intended to have a mixed salutary 
and deterrent effect. The examples we gave were taxes on 
illegal activities (like possession of drugs) and on activities 
that the state concededly wished to discourage. See id. at 
1259. Such mixed measures will not be deemed to have an 
objectively punitive purpose despite their deterrent purpose 
unless that deterrent purpose is an unnecessary 
complement to the measure's salutary operation, the 
measure is operating in an unusual manner inconsistent 
with its historically mixed purposes, or the deterrent 
purpose overwhelms the salutary purpose. See id. at 1263. 
 
"The final prong [of the Artway analysis] examines 
whether the effects--or `sting'--of a measure is so harsh `as 
a matter of degree' that it constitutes `punishment.' " Id. at 
1266 (citing California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 
U.S. 499, 509 (1995)). This prong necessarily involves 
difficult line-drawing. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
case law provides only a few fixed points. We know that, 
under certain circumstances, the "sting" of incarceration or 
forfeiture of one's citizenship is sufficiently extraordinary to 
require a finding of punishment, see Miller v. Florida, 482 
U.S. 423 (1987); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and we 
have recently been told that civil commitment of violent sex 
offenders does not, see Kansas v. Hendricks, ___ U.S. ___, 
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). 
 
B. The Impact Of Ursery And Hendricks 
 
There are two recent Supreme Court cases which 
potentially bear upon our decision: United States v. Ursery, 
116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), and Kansas v. Hendricks, ___ U.S. 
___, 117 S. Ct. at 2072. Appellees insist that after Ursery 
and Hendricks, Artway does not provide an appropriate 
standard for determining whether Megan's Law notification 
constitutes "punishment" for purposes of the Ex Post Facto 
and Double Jeopardy Clauses. We disagree. 
 
In Ursery, the Supreme Court held that "civil forfeitures 
. . . do not constitute `punishment' for purposes of the 
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Double Jeopardy Clause" even when the value of the 
property forfeited is arguably excessive when compared to 
the harm suffered by the government from the conduct 
giving rise to the forfeiture. 116 S. Ct. at 2138. The Court 
first emphasized that its case law had sharply 
distinguished between in rem forfeiture proceedings and in 
personam civil fine proceedings. It explained that in the 
latter "it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded 
against . . . and punished" while in the former "it is the 
property which is proceeded against, and by resort to a 
legal fiction, held guilty and condemned." Id. at 2145 
(quoting from Various Items of Personal Property v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 577, 580-81 (1931)). Thus, civil forfeitures 
are not "criminal punishments because they [do] not 
impose a second in personam penalty for the criminal 
defendant's wrongdoing." Id. at 2141. Second, the Court 
noted, "[c]ivil forfeitures, in contrast to civil penalties, are 
designed to do more than simply compensate the 
Government. Forfeitures . . . are designed primarily to 
confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to 
require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct. [For 
this reason,] it is virtually impossible to quantify, even 
approximately, the nonpunitive purposes served by a 
particular civil forfeiture." Id. at 2145. Accordingly, while a 
court can determine whether a civil fine has a punitive 
component by comparing its size to the harm experienced 
by the government, a court is not in a position "to 
determine whether a particular forfeiture bears no rational 
relationship to the nonpunitive purposes of that forfeiture." 
Id. 
 
The holding of Ursery is a narrow one limited to civil 
forfeitures. Neither of the principal rationales supporting its 
conclusion is pertinent here and we find nothing in the 
Court's reasoning that is inconsistent with the Artway 
standard.14 It necessarily follows that Ursery provides no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. To the contrary, we believe the Court's opinion in Ursery confirms, 
directly or indirectly, that, inter alia, (1) measures motivated by 
retributive animus are punishment, (2) even when the legislative action 
is not so motivated, an adverse consequence resulting from an in 
personam proceeding may be punishment if it is disproportionate to the 
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justification for abandoning that standard. See Third 
Circuit Internal Operating Procedures 9.1. 
 
After the district court's decision in these cases, the 
Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 
2072. The Court there upheld a Kansas statute that 
provides for the civil commitment of "sexually violent 
predators." See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. Under 
the statute, a person convicted or charged with a violent 
sexual offense and suffering from a "mental abnormality or 
personality disorder which makes the person likely to 
engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence," § 59- 
29a02(a), may be confined to state custody for "control, 
care and treatment until such time as the person's mental 
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the 
person is safe to be at large," § 59-29a07(a). Prior to Leroy 
Hendricks' scheduled release from prison, the state invoked 
the statute to have him confined as a sexual predator. 
Hendricks, who had an extensive history of molesting 
children, challenged the act on substantive due process, ex 
post facto, and double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme 
Court rejected all three claims and held that the state's 
involuntary commitment program did not constitute 
punishment for the purpose of ex post facto or double 
jeopardy. 
 
Like Ursery, Hendricks does not establish "a single 
`formula' " for identifying which legislative measures 
constitute punishment and which do not. Morales , 514 U.S. 
at 509. However, the context involved in Hendricks--civil 
commitment of sex offenders--is, obviously, more closely 
related to the context involved here than was the context of 
Ursery. In determining the continuing viability of Artway, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
remedial goal which the measure purports to pursue, and (3) measures 
that have traditionally been regarded as nonpunitive are not punishment 
in the absence of a retributive motive. If we considered ourselves free to 
disregard the Artway standard, we would be required, once again, to 
"divine" a "test for punishment" by looking for common considerations in 
essentially the same set of Supreme Court precedents. Artway, 81 F.3d 
at 1254. With the one exception noted hereafter in the text, we see no 
reason to believe our result would be materially different if we repeated 
that process. 
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therefore, we must give careful consideration to how 
Hendricks addressed the question of whether civil 
commitment is punishment. We find substantial overlap 
between the factors relied on in Hendricks and those that 
comprise the Artway test and we discern no need to 
abandon (or overhaul) Artway. 
 
The Court's analysis in Hendricks begins by inquiring 
into "the legislature's stated intent," 117 S. Ct. at 2082, 
just as Artway directs that we begin with the legislature's 
actual purpose. The Court found Kansas' placement of the 
challenged provision in the probate code instead of the 
criminal code, and the legislature's description of its 
creation as a "civil commitment procedure," to be evidence 
of the legislature's "disavow[ing] any punitive intent." Id. at 
2082, 2085. "Nothing on the face of the statute suggest[ed] 
that the legislature sought to create anything other than a 
civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public 
from harm." Id. at 2082. 
 
Hendricks then goes beyond the legislature's stated intent 
to consider additional factors, including those factors 
Artway incorporates into its objective purpose prong. Like 
Artway's inquiry into proportionality, Hendricks repeatedly 
describes how the Kansas statute is tailored to achieve its 
remedial purpose of protecting the public. The Court 
observes that prior criminal conduct is appropriately 
examined for the narrow evidentiary purpose of predicting 
dangerousness. See id. The Court also notes that Kansas 
"limited confinement to a small segment of particularly 
dangerous individuals," id. at 2085, and that those affected 
individuals do not "remain confined any longer than [they] 
suffer[ ] from a mental abnormality rendering [them] unable 
to control [their] dangerousness," id.  at 2083. As the Court 
recognizes, "[f]ar from any punitive objective, the 
confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated 
purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person 
until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a 
threat to others." Id. Finally, the Court observes that the 
individuals are subject only to the conditions placed on any 
involuntarily committed person in a state mental institution 
and not to the "more restrictive conditions" placed on state 
prisoners. Id. at 2082. 
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Hendricks, like Artway, relied heavily on history. In the 
Court's view, the confinement involved is "one classic 
example" in a long history of measures restricting the 
freedom of the dangerously mentally ill--legislative 
initiatives which have been consistently held to be 
nonpunitive. Id. at 2083. The Court specifically analogized 
the Kansas confinement to the quarantines of those 
afflicted with highly contagious diseases, and recognized 
that it has "never held that the Constitution prevents a 
State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is 
available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others." 
Id. at 2084. 
 
There is also support in Hendricks for Artway's inquiry 
into the relationship between a "mixed" measure's salutary 
and deterrent purposes. Hendricks discusses the multiple 
purposes of the Kansas statute, including incapacitation of 
dangerous sex offenders as well as their treatment, and 
concludes that the statute would not constitute 
punishment even if providing treatment were merely an 
"ancillary purpose"--and not the "primary" purpose--for 
passing the statute. Id. This is consistent with Artway's 
allowance that a measure can be non-punitive even when it 
does not have solely "salutary" purposes such as treatment. 
 
Though Hendricks does not explicitly discuss what 
Artway calls the "effects prong," we find nothing in 
Hendricks inconsistent with Artway's direction to examine 
what the challenged measure actually does to the affected 
individuals. This is not to say, of course, that Hendricks 
lacks implications for the application of the effects prong. 
The Court held that potentially indefinite civil commitment 
of dangerous sex predators is not punishment. This 
provides a new and important "fixed point" that is of 
great utility in determining on which side of the 
punitive/nonpunitive line to place community notification. 
 
Although Hendricks thus does not suggest to us that any 
of the considerations identified as relevant in Artway are no 
longer relevant to a challenge based on the Ex Post Facto 
and Double Jeopardy Clauses, we do discern a teaching in 
Hendricks that we do not discern in the Supreme Court 
case law preceding Artway. In the course of holding that 
Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act "does not impose 
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punishment," id. at 2086, the Hendricks Court made the 
following cogent observation regarding the deference that 
must be accorded to the legislature's judgment as to 
whether its action is remedial: 
 
 Although we recognize that a "civil label is not always 
dispositive," Allen [v. Illinois , 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)], 
we will reject the legislature's manifest intent only 
where a party challenging the statute provides "the 
clearest proof " that "the statutory scheme[is] so 
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate[the 
State's] intention" to deem it "civil." United States v. 
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641, 
65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). 
 
Id. at 2082. 
 
As we pointed out in Artway, the Supreme Court had 
previously required this degree of deference only in cases 
where the issue before it was "whether a proceeding is 
effectively criminal so that the procedural protections of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments must apply" in that 
proceeding. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1262 n.26. After Hendricks, 
however, it seems clear that similar deference to the 
legislative judgment is required whenever legislative 
measures are challenged on the basis of the Ex Post Facto 
and Double Jeopardy Clauses.15 While the Hendricks Court 
did characterize Hendricks' claim at one point as an 
"argument . . . that the Act establishes criminal 
proceedings," 117 S. Ct. at 2081, the issue before the Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. This aspect of Hendricks was foreshadowed in Ursery where, as we 
have noted, the Court entertained a double jeopardy challenge to federal 
civil forfeiture legislation. After concluding that Congress had not 
intended the legislation as punitive, the Court observed: 
 
 Moving to the second stage of our analysis, wefind that there is 
little evidence, much less the "clearest proof " that we require, 
suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) 
and (a)(7), and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in form and 
effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the 
contrary. 
 
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
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was whether the Act imposed "punishment" for purposes of 
the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, and the 
Court's holding was that the Act did not. 
 
Accordingly, in Artway terms, if we determine that the 
actual legislative purpose was remedial, we must sustain 
Megan's Law against the current challenges unless its 
objective purpose or its effect are sufficiently punitive to 
overcome a presumption favoring the legislative judgment. 
 
C. Legislative Purpose 
 
As we have indicated, in Artway we addressed only 
whether Tier 1 registrants under Megan's Law are subjected 
to punishment--that is, whether being required to register, 
and having the resulting disclosures available to law 
enforcement personnel, constitute punishment. In that 
context, we determined "whether the legislature's actual 
purpose [when enacting Megan's Law] was to punish." 
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264. Looking to the statute's own 
statement of purpose16 and the scant legislative history,17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The Legislature finds and declares: 
 
a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders 
who commit other predatory acts against children, and the dangers 
posed by persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, 
require a system of registration that will permit law enforcement 
officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the 
public safety. 
 
b. A system of registration of sex offenders and offenders who 
commit other predatory acts against children will provide law 
enforcement with additional information critical to preventing and 
promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing 
persons. 
 
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1; Artway 81 F.3d at 1264. 
 
17. The only other legislative history is the following statement that 
accompanied the bill when it was introduced in the state senate: 
 
 Heinous crimes have been committed against children after [sex 
offenders'] release from incarceration. The most recent case involves 
the tragic rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka of 
Hamilton Township by a neighbor who had committed sex offenses 
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we found that the legislative purpose of Megan's Law was to 
identify potential recidivists and alert the public when 
necessary for the public safety, and to help prevent and 
promptly resolve incidents involving sexual abuse and 
missing persons. We then noted that "[p]rotecting the 
public and preventing crimes are the types of purposes [the 
Supreme Court has] found `regulatory' and not punitive." 
Id.; see also De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160. We therefore 
concluded that the restrictive provisions of Megan's Law 
passed the "actual purpose" test. 
 
Since in Artway we were only dealing with a challenge to 
registration, we were not required to definitively resolve the 
legal question of the actual purpose of notification.18 
However, the record evidence of legislative intent is exactly 
the same for both registration and notification. Nothing has 
been called to our attention that causes us to change the 
conclusion we reached in Artway regarding this evidence. 
While the appellants view the context in which Megan's Law 
was enacted as indicative of a punitive intent, wefind it 
entirely consistent with its declared remedial purpose. 
Accordingly, we have no basis for questioning the 
legislature's declared purpose, which is remedial and devoid 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
against children. Residents of the neighborhood had no knowledge 
of the man's criminal history. 
 
 Because sex offenders are likely to be unsusceptible to the "cures" 
offered by the prison system, the urges that cause them to commit 
offenses can never be eliminated but merely controlled. The danger 
posed by the presence of a sex offender who has committed violent 
acts against children requires a system of notification to protect the 
public safety and welfare of the community. 
 
Senate Bill No. 14 (N.J. Sept. 12, 1994); Artway , 81 F.3d at 1264. 
 
18. Appellants assert that all we determined in Artway was that the 
actual purpose of registration is remedial; they claim we said nothing 
about the legislative purpose for notification. They are mistaken. In 
Artway, we used what appeared to us to be the nonpunitive actual 
purpose of notification as the predicate for determining that the 
motivation for registration is remedial as well. See 81 F.3d at 1264 ("[I]f 
the legislature's actual purpose in notification was remedial, it is hard to 
imagine that its purpose in the predicate and less harsh step of 
registration was punitive."). 
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of any indication of an intent to punish. We must give 
substantial deference to that judgment. 
 
D. Objective Purpose 
 
In Artway, we concluded that registration and Tier 1 
notification of law enforcement personnel was fully 
explained by the nonpunitive, legislative purpose. We 
explained: 
 
 Here, the solely remedial purpose of helping law 
enforcement agencies keep tabs on these offenders fully 
explains requiring certain sex offenders to register. 
Registration may allow officers to prevent future crimes 
by intervening in dangerous situations. . . . [T]he 
registrant may face some unpleasantness from having 
to register and update his registration[, b]ut the 
remedial purpose of knowing the whereabouts of sex 
offenders fully explains the registration provision . . . . 
And the means chosen--registration and law 
enforcement notification only--is not excessive in any 
way. Registration, therefore, is certainly "reasonably 
related" to a legitimate goal: allowing law enforcement 
to stay vigilant against possible re-abuse. 
 
81 F.3d at 1265. 
 
The issue now before us is whether the provisions of 
Megan's Law that call for dissemination of information 
about registrants beyond law enforcement personnel are 
also fully explained by the nonpunitive, legislative purpose. 
In addressing this issue, there is a lesson in the above- 
quoted portion of Artway that we must keep in mind. The 
relevant issue is whether these provisions are " `reasonably 
related' to a legitimate goal." Nothing in Artway or the 
Supreme Court cases upon which it relies requires a perfect 
fit between end and means. Nor does anything in Ursery or 
Hendricks. An absence of remedial, objective purpose is not 
demonstrated by pointing out that the legislature did not 
address what might be perceived as another aspect of the 
same problem or that there may be a means of serving the 
legislative end that would be more effective than the means 
chosen. If a reasonable legislator motivated solely by the 
declared remedial goals could have believed the means 
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chosen were justified by those goals, then an objective 
observer would have no basis for perceiving a punitive 
purpose in the adoption of those means. 
 
We conclude that the Tier 2 and 3 dissemination of 
information beyond law enforcement personnel is 
reasonably related to the nonpunitive goals of Megan's Law. 
As we have already indicated, these goals include 
identifying potential recidivists, notifying those who are 
likely to interact with such recidivists to the extent 
necessary to protect public safety, and helping prevent 
future incidents of sexual abuse. The fundamental premise 
of Megan's Law is that registration and carefully tailored 
notification can enable law enforcement and those likely to 
encounter a sex offender to be aware of a potential danger 
and "to stay vigilant against possible re-abuse." Id. This is 
not an unreasonable premise. 
 
Moreover, these goals have not been pursued in a way 
that has imposed a burden on registrants that clearly 
exceeds the burden inherent in accomplishment of the 
goals. The statutory scheme is a measured response to the 
identified problem that does not subject all registrants to 
dissemination of information beyond law enforcement 
personnel. The Guidelines call for a risk assessment based 
on objective criteria, all of which might reasonably be 
perceived as relevant to the degree of risk presented by 
each registrant. This risk assessment is utilized to 
determine the maximum scope of the notification 
concerning the registrant. In the case of Tier 1 registrants, 
who comprise over 45% of those required to register, 
dissemination is limited to law enforcement personnel. In 
the case of the moderate risk registrants in Tier 2, who 
comprise 50% of those evaluated, dissemination is limited 
to those in the community who have responsibility for, or 
provide support to, those who are most likely to be 
victimized if the registrant recidivates. Even with respect to 
the 5% of registrants determined to pose higher risk, there 
is no unlimited public dissemination. Under the Guidelines, 
information is disseminated only to those who are 
"reasonably certain" to encounter the registrant. 
 
Appellants nevertheless insist that the remedial goal of 
Megan's Law does not fully justify the means selected. 
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First, they point to the fact that risk assessment under the 
Guidelines is based primarily on the registrant's past 
behavior. Past criminal conduct is the basis for 90 of the 
possible 111 points in the Registrant Risk Assessment 
Scale. Id. at 1266 n.30. According to appellants, this Scale 
fails to take sufficient account of treatment or other positive 
changes in a registrant's life. They conclude that"the reach 
of this law will necessarily be excessive, encompassing 
those who do not actually pose a genuine risk of re- 
offense." Appellants' Br. at 41. However, the non-existence 
of a perfect predictor of recidivism should not preclude 
legislative resort to a rationally based instrument of risk 
assessment, developed and validated by mental health 
professionals. The most appellants have done is to suggest 
that a more effective predictor might be devised; that is not 
enough to make the objective purpose of the predictor 
adopted a punitive one.19 
 
Appellants further suggest that the information 
disseminated is often excessive in light of the stated 
remedial aims. The information disseminated with respect 
to a Tier 2 or Tier 3 registrant includes his or her name, 
description, recent photograph, address, place of 
employment or schooling, and a description of any vehicle 
used by him or her along with its license number. 
Appellants point out that some of this information will 
sometimes be unnecessary. "[F]or example, if the registrant 
works 20 or 30 miles from his home, the registrant's 
neighbor who receives notification is not `likely to 
encounter' the registrant at his place of employment. 
Likewise, those who live near the same registrant's place of 
employment are not `likely to encounter' the registrant at 
his home. Yet in both instances, notification includes the 
same information . . . ." Id. 
 
We are not persuaded. First, information that an offender 
does not spend all of his time in the vicinity, but does have 
a residence or a place of employment/school elsewhere, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. As the Court expressly recognized in Hendricks, "[p]revious instances 
of violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent 
tendencies." 117 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 
(1993)). 
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may indeed serve a remedial purpose in helping individuals 
know when it is that they are "likely to encounter" the 
offender. Moreover, even if this were not so, a decision not 
to expend the resources necessary to tailor each notice to 
the circumstances of the person receiving notice is hardly 
inconsistent with good faith pursuit of the declared 
remedial purposes. 
 
Having found a reasonable "fit" between end and means, 
we turn to historical precedent. To appellants, the 
dissemination of information beyond law enforcement 
personnel is closely analogous to the well-recognized 
historical punishments of public shaming, humiliation and 
banishment as those practices were employed in colonial 
times. We rejected a very similar argument in United States 
v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). There, the district 
court had denied the media the right to copy, for 
rebroadcast, video and audio tapes admitted into evidence 
and played to the jury during a criminal trial. In support of 
its decision to foreclose post-trial dissemination of public 
record information to the public, the district court made the 
following observation: 
 
 The greater and more widespread the publicity about 
a particular criminal case, the more likely it is that 
penalties not prescribed by the law will be visited upon 
the accused and, more importantly, upon innocent 
relatives and friends. . . . 
 
 Given the nature of our society these side effects are 
inevitable; indeed, it can be argued that they form an 
important, if unofficial, part of the sanctions imposed 
by society upon lawbreakers. The unfortunate fact is, 
however, that these side effects are not uniformly 
visited upon persons accused of violating the law. And, 
since they are not an official part of the criminal justice 
process, and are beyond the reach of that process, 
there is probably no acceptable way of ensuring 
uniformity of application. 
 
Id. at 824 (quoting United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 
854, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). In pursuing this theme, the 
district court likened the proposed rebroadcast to placing 
the defendant in public stocks. 
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We rejected the tendered analogy: 
 
 Nor can we accept the [district] court's strained 
analogy of rebroadcast to "parading a convicted 
defendant through the streets, or holding him up to 
public ridicule by exhibiting him in a cage or in the 
stocks." 501 F. Supp. at 860. 
 
Id. at 825. Nor can we accept the suggested analogy 
between notification's re-publication of information publicly 
available at the time of a sex offender's trial and the holding 
of a convicted defendant up to public ridicule. Public 
shaming, humiliation and banishment all involve more than 
the dissemination of information. State dissemination of 
information about a crime and its perpetrators was 
unnecessary in colonial times because all in the colonial 
settlement would have knowledge of these matters. Rather, 
these colonial practices inflicted punishment because they 
either physically held the person up before his or her fellow 
citizens for shaming or physically removed him or her from 
the community. 
 
The "sting" of Megan's Law for Tier 2 and 3 registrants 
results not from their being publicly displayed for ridicule 
and shaming but rather from the dissemination of accurate 
public record information about their past criminal 
activities and a risk assessment by responsible public 
agencies based on that information. This distinction makes 
a substantial difference when one looks for the relevant 
historical understanding of our society. Dissemination of 
information about criminal activity has always held the 
potential for substantial negative consequences for those 
involved in that activity. Dissemination of such information 
in and of itself, however, has never been regarded as 
punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate 
governmental interest. 
 
When there is probable cause to believe that someone 
has committed a crime, our law has always insisted on 
public indictment, public trial, and public imposition of 
sentence, all of which necessarily entail public 
dissemination of information about the alleged activities of 
the accused. As this court has explained, we insist upon 
this public dissemination for a number of reasons: It 
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"heightens public respect for the judicial process," it 
"permits the public to . . . serve as a check upon the 
judicial process," and it "plays an important role in the . . . 
free discussion of governmental affairs." Publicker 
Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 
1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Wholly 
independent of the criminal sanctions that conviction may 
entail, the consequences of our law requiring this public 
dissemination of information can be severe. In every case, 
a conviction becomes a matter of public record, and in 
many cases that conviction may receive widespread media 
attention. Depending upon the crime and the 
circumstances, information disseminated as a result of our 
insistence on public prosecution may be the source of a 
wide range of adverse consequences for the convicted 
defendant, running from mild personal embarrassment to 
social ostracism and/or vigilante retribution. Employment 
may be lost, and the opportunity for future employment 
may be dramatically reduced. It may take a lifetime of effort 
on the part of a convicted defendant to restore previously 
existing relationships with those with whom he deals 
personally, and restoration of his reputation among others 
may never occur. Nevertheless, our laws' insistence that 
information regarding criminal proceedings be publicly 
disseminated is not intended as punishment and has never 
been regarded as such. 
 
We believe the required dissemination of information 
generated by our criminal justice system and the 
subsequent dissemination of "rap sheet" information to 
regulatory agencies, bar associations, prospective employers 
and interested members of the public20  constitute far more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. New Jersey law specifically guarantees public access to all court 
records, including those concerning criminal prosecutions. See Doe, 662 
A.2d at 407 (citing Executive Order No. 123). Moreover, as the New 
Jersey Supreme Court noted in Doe, any person, under New Jersey law, 
"may obtain a complete criminal history from the State Police by 
providing a name and either date of birth or social security number and 
paying a fifteen dollar fee." Id. 
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compelling analogies than the stocks, cages, and scarlet 
letters referenced by appellants.21 
 
We also agree with appellees that various forms of state 
warnings about threats to public safety provide more apt 
analogies to Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification than the 
referenced colonial practices. In order to provide members 
of the public with an opportunity to take steps to protect 
themselves, the government has traditionally published 
appropriate warnings about a range of public hazards. 
Posters warning that a pictured individual is abroad in the 
community and to be regarded as armed and dangerous 
come most readily to mind. But there are others as well. 
The state has traditionally, for example, posted quarantine 
notices when public health is endangered by individuals 
with infectious diseases. Cf. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 
("A State could hardly be seen as furthering a`punitive' 
purpose by [isolating] persons inflicted with a[ ] highly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. "Rap Sheets" are less readily available today than in days past, but 
this reflects a policy judgment about the appropriate balance between 
the defendant's interest in getting a new start and the interest of others 
who might find "Rap Sheet" information relevant to their decision 
making. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764-65 (1989) (observing federal and state statutory 
and regulatory limitations on access to "Rap Sheets"). It does not reflect 
a general understanding that the dissemination of "Rap Sheet" 
information by the government is additional punishment. 
 
While the Supreme Court recognized in Reporters Committee that "Rap 
Sheets" are protected under the privacy-for-law-enforcement-records 
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), 
such protection reflects a Congressional policy judgment, not federal 
Constitutional law. See id. at 762 n.13. The Court explained: 
 
 The question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the FOIA 
is, of course, not the same as the question whether a tort action 
might lie for invasion of privacy or the question whether an 
individual's interest in privacy is protected by the Constitution. See, 
e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
(Constitution prohibits State from penalizing publication of name of 
deceased rape victim obtained from public records); Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 712-714 (1976) (no constitutional privacy right 
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contagious disease.").22 Significantly, these warnings 
communicate not only facts about past events but also the 
fact that a public agency has found a significant future risk 
based on those events. 
 
Whenever these state notices are directed to a risk posed 
by individuals in the community, those individuals can 
expect to experience embarrassment and isolation. 
Nevertheless, it is generally recognized that the state has a 
right to issue such warnings and the negative effects are 
not regarded as punishment. Because the closest analogies 
have not historically been regarded as punishment, we 
conclude that historical precedent does not demonstrate an 
objective punitive purpose. 
 
Finally, we turn to the third consideration involved in 
assessing objective purpose. That consideration, as we 
understand it, is a savings provision--that is, even if the 
remedial purpose of a measure cannot fairly be said to 
justify all of its aspects, it will nevertheless be found 
nonpunitive if measures of this type, like taxes, have 
traditionally served both remedial and deterrent purposes 
and the particular measure before the court serves such 
purposes in a manner consistent with its analogous 
antecedents. Having concluded that the remedial purpose 
of Megan's Law justifies all of its aspects, it necessarily 
follows in this case, as it did in Artway, 81 F.3d at 1266, 
that this third consideration does not counsel in favor of a 




As we have indicated, we hypothesized in Artway  that "a 
law [could] constitute unconstitutional `punishment' 
because of its effects" even where no actual or objective 
punitive purpose is shown. 81 F.3d at 1260. We explained: 
 
[An] examination of effects, like the Austin [v. United 
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993),] inquiry into history, is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Other examples are provided by the New Jersey statutes requiring 
public notice when an adult inmate is considered for parole and notice 
to victims upon a defendant's release from incarceration. See N.J.S.A. 
30:4-123.48g & 123.45b(5); N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44b(21). 
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necessary to limit what would otherwise be the 
untenable results of the De Veau subjective purpose 
inquiry and the Halper means-end calculus. While even 
a substantial "sting" will not render a measure 
"punishment," . . . at some level the "sting" will be so 
sharp that it can only be considered punishment 
regardless of the legislators' subjective thoughts. 
 
Id. at 1261. 
 
It is clear from Artway, however, that for the effects of a 
measure to render it "punishment," those effects must be 
extremely onerous. Even deprivation of one's livelihood is 
not sufficiently onerous. Flemming v. Nestor , 363 U.S. 603 
(1960) (termination of social security benefits); Hawker v. 
New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (revocation of license to 
practice one's profession). Moreover, while Artway's third 
prong serves as an independent hurdle that a legislative 
measure must surmount, when it is applied, the burden 
imposed must still be evaluated in the light of the 
importance of any legitimate governmental interest served. 
The only examples the case law suggests of effects 
sufficiently onerous are deprivation of one's United States 
citizenship that leaves one a "stateless person" and a 
complete deprivation of personal freedom (i.e., 
incarceration). Even these deprivations are not per se 
punishment, however. While in some circumstances 
making one a "stateless person" is punishment, 
denaturalization as a remedy for citizenship fraudulently 
obtained is regarded not as punishment but as a necessary 
part of regulating naturalization of aliens. See Trop, 356 
U.S. at 98. Even incarceration is not always punishment. 
Pre-trial detention and post-sentence civil commitment of 
dangerous offenders have both been expressly found to be 
nonpunitive measures when justified by important state 
interests. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); 
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2072. 
 
The direct effects of Megan's Law clearly do not rise to 
the level of extremely onerous burdens that sting so 
severely as to compel a conclusion of punishment. All 
Megan's Law mandates is registration and notification. 
Under Megan's Law, New Jersey has not deprived 
appellants of their freedom or their citizenship. The state 
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has imposed no restrictions on a registrant's ability to live 
and work in a community, to move from place to place, to 
obtain a professional license or to secure governmental 
benefits. 
 
What concerns registrants, however, are the indirect 
effects: Actions that members of the community may take 
as a result of learning of the registrant's past, his potential 
danger, and his presence in the community. People interact 
with others based on the information they have about 
them. Knowing that someone is a convicted sex offender 
and has been evaluated as a continuing risk is likely to 
affect how most people treat that person. 
 
There can be no doubt that the indirect effects of Tier 2 
and Tier 3 notification on the registrants involved and their 
families are harsh. The record documents that registrants 
and their families have experienced profound humiliation 
and isolation as a result of the reaction of those notified. 
Employment and employment opportunities have been 
jeopardized or lost. Housing and housing opportunities 
have suffered a similar fate. Family and other personal 
relationships have been destroyed or severely strained. 
Retribution has been visited by private, unlawful violence 
and threats and, while such incidents of "vigilante justice" 
are not common, they happen with sufficient frequency and 
publicity that registrants justifiably live in fear of them. It 
also must be noted that these indirect effects are not short- 
lived. While there are suggestions in the record that the 
circumstances of a registrant may stabilize as time passes 
after notification, the statute permits repeat notification 
over a period of many years. 
 
The primary sting from Megan's Law notification comes 
by way of injury to what is denoted in constitutional 
parlance as reputational interests. This includes the 
burdens of isolation, harassment, loss of opportunities, and 
the myriad of more subtle ways in which one is treated 
differently by virtue of being known as a potentially 
dangerous sex offender. The other type of indirect effect is 
exposure to an increased risk of private violence that can 
result in damage to one's property or injury to one's person. 
We will focus on each class of indirect effects in turn. 
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Injury to reputation has traditionally been regarded in 
our society as a serious matter. Our law of defamation has 
from our earliest days protected reputation and provided 
compensation for wrongful injury to reputational interests. 
It has provided recourse, for example, for those whose 
reputations are injured by false allegations of criminal 
activity. At the same time, however, reputational interests 
have not been accorded the same level of protection in our 
society as interests that have been found "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty." Paul v. Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 
713 (1976). 
 
In Paul v. Davis, law enforcement officials decided to alert 
local area merchants to possible shoplifters who might be 
operating during the Christmas season. They distributed a 
"flyer" to 800 merchants which contained the name and 
"mug shot" photo of individuals described as"Active 
Shoplifters." Davis, who had previously been arrested for-- 
but never convicted of--shoplifting was included. 
 
Davis brought a civil rights action against the law 
enforcement officials arguing that, by destroying his 
reputation in the community, they had violated his"right to 
privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 712. Though 
acknowledging that the Constitution secures a right to 
personal privacy, the Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that Davis' interest in his reputation was sufficiently 
fundamental to come within that constitutional right. The 
Court observed: 
 
In Roe [v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)], the Court 
pointed out that the personal rights found in this 
guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those 
which are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty" as described in Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The activities detailed as 
being within this definition were ones very different 
from that for which respondent claims constitutional 
protection--matters relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing 
and education. In these areas it has been held that 
there are limitations on the States' power to 
substantively regulate conduct. 
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Respondent's claim is far afield from this line of 
decisions. He claims constitutional protection against 
the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting 
charge. His claim is based, not upon any challenge to 
the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a 
sphere contended to be "private," but instead on a 
claim that the State may not publicize a record of an 
official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive 
privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we 
decline to enlarge them in this manner. 
 
Id. at 713. 
 
The indirect effects experienced by Tier 2 and Tier 3 
registrants, while quite likely more profound than those 
complained of by Davis, are clearly of a similar nature. Just 
as Davis sought constitutional protection from the 
consequences of state disclosure of the fact of his 
shoplifting arrest and law enforcement's assessment that he 
was a continuing risk, so registrants seek protection from 
what may follow disclosure of facts related to their sex 
offense convictions and the resulting judgment of the state 
that they are a continuing risk. It follows that, just as the 
officers' publication of the official act of Davis' arrest did 
not violate any fundamental privacy right of Davis', neither 
does New Jersey's publication (through notification) of 
registrants' convictions and findings of dangerousness 
implicate any interest of fundamental constitutional 
magnitude. The reputational interests asserted by 
appellants are "very different" from matters relating to 
marriage, procreation, and child rearing, and are therefore 
"far afield" from what has been deemed "fundamental" by 
the Constitution.23 
 
Hendricks, and the long line of cases on which it relies, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23.  Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 749, does not call Paul's teaching 
into question. We do not agree with the Supreme Court of New Jersey's 
conclusion in Doe that the recognition in Reporters Committee of a 
statutory right to privacy for "Rap Sheets" under FOIA dictates that a 
federal Constitutional right to privacy is implicated by notification. See 
Doe, 662 A.2d at 410-11. As mentioned above, Reporters Committee 
noted the differences between "privacy" under FOIA and an "individual's 
interest in privacy" under the federal Constitution. 489 U.S. at 762 n.13. 
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counsels that bona fide remedial legislation may inflict very 
substantial individual hardship without implicating the Ex 
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. It necessarily 
follows that some limit must be placed on the situations in 
which a measure's sting alone, despite its remedial purpose 
and effect, will constitute punishment under those clauses 
and that classification as punishment on the basis of sting 
alone must be reserved for cases involving deprivation of 
the interests most highly valued in our constitutional 
republic. "[F]reedom from physical restraint`has always 
been at the core of the liberty protected' " by the 
Constitution. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079 (quoting 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Freedom of 
thought and expression and freedom from state interference 
with the privacy interests identified in Davis  are similarly 
"implicit in our concept of ordered liberty." Davis, 424 U.S. 
at 713. Interests such as these are sufficiently fundamental 
to our constitutionally secured liberty that state 
interference with them can be justified only by the most 
important of state interests.24Davis establishes that 
reputational interests are not among these fundamental 
liberty interests. 
 
We believe the state's interest protecting the public here 
is similar to, and as compelling as, the state interest served 
by the civil commitment statute in Hendricks. Accordingly, 
based on Hendricks, we believe that the state's interest here 
would suffice to justify the deprivation even if a 
fundamental right of the registrant's were implicated. Given 
that something less than a fundamental interest is 
implicated, the impact of Megan's Law on the registrants' 




24. As we explained in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 688 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992): 
 
Government interference with personal rights within the scope of the 
life, liberty, or property umbrella of the Due Process Clauses must 
be justified by a legitimate state interest; government interference 
with a "fundamental right" may be justified only by the most 
important of state interests. 
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We now turn to the second type of indirect effects arising 
from notification. As we earlier observed, the record bears 
evidence of retributive assaults on registrants by private 
individuals. There is also evidence of vandalism and other 
damage to property of registrants and their associates. As 
we have also noted, however, each notification is 
accompanied by a warning against misuse of the 
information conveyed and an assurance that any private 
violence will be prosecuted. This is thus not a situation in 
which the state has encouraged private violence. Nor is it a 
situation in which the state has in some way incapacitated 
a person from taking steps to protect him- or herself 
against private violence or has deprived a citizen of the law 
enforcement protection accorded to others in the population 
generally. On the contrary, the state has taken affirmative 
steps to discourage private violence in response to 
notification, and is providing registrants with the law 
enforcement protection available to others. 
 
We agree with the district court that the risk of private 
violence stems primarily from a registrant's past criminal 
activity. The most that can be said about notification is that 
the state, by disseminating accurate information about a 
registrant's crime and its assessment of future risk, may 
materially extend the period during which the increased 
risk of private violence may exist. While the extension of 
that increased risk is understandably of concern to 
plaintiffs, they have not persuaded us that the magnitude 
of the risk is such as to require classification of its 
extension as punishment. Although the record reflects that 
personal injury and property damage from private violence 
has occurred, it also reflects that these occurrences are 
relatively rare. Of the 135 notifications completed in New 
Jersey for which there is record data, only two occasioned 
assaults or property damage deemed serious enough by the 
victim-registrant to warrant a report to law enforcement 
authorities. Even if we were prepared to broaden our 
consideration to include examples of physical harm to 
registrants not reported to police, this would increase the 
total number of record cases to just three. Our record with 
respect to Washington and Oregon also evidences that 
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reported instances of personal injury or property damage 
are rare.25 
 
As we view this matter, there is unfortunately a 
background risk of private violence that is necessarily 
assumed by everyone in our society. When one commits a 
reprehensible crime and is publicly prosecuted, that risk is 
undoubtedly augmented to a limited degree. The duration 
of that degree of augmented risk is likely to be extended by 
notification pursuant to Megan's Law and this is 
understandably a concern for registrants. Nevertheless, we 
believe the Supreme Court would not regard this indirect 
effect of Megan's Law as sufficiently burdensome to require 
classification of the law as punitive. Certainly, in terms of 
the impact on the everyday lives of registrants, the burden 
of this aspect of Megan's Law pales by comparison to the 
civil commitment of sex offenders sanctioned in Hendricks. 
 
F. Satisfaction Of The Artway Test 
 
Because Megan's Law satisfies each of the three elements 
of the Artway test, we hold that the notification required by 
Megan's Law does not constitute punishment for purposes 
of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. The Supreme Court has held that "[a]mong the historic liberties . . . 
protected [by the Constitution is] a right to be free from . . . unjustified 
[state] intrusions on personal security." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 673 (1977). For citizens who are not in the custody of the state, 
however, this right does not include the right to state protection from 
private violence. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. 
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The "state created danger" cases based 
upon this right to personal security do not recognize a right that is 
implicated here because they do not involve situations where the risk 
created is justified by the state's pursuit of a legitimate public interest. 
See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
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VI. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ISSUES 
 
A. Deprivation Of A Liberty Interest 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. 
Const. Amend. XIV. Appellants insist that they have a 
liberty interest that entitles them to the protection of 
procedural due process under this provision. Appellees 
insist that there is no such interest. 
 
Liberty interests that trigger procedural due process may 
be created by state law or by the federal constitution itself. 
See Sandin v. Conner, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). 
We need not reach the issue of whether appellants have a 
liberty interest recognized by the federal constitution 
because we are satisfied that appellants have a liberty 
interest created by the New Jersey Constitution of which 
they cannot be deprived without being accorded the process 
due under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
If a state law requires that the freedom of a person on 
parole or probation cannot be taken away without cause, 
the state has created a liberty interest that cannot be taken 
away without the process due under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Similarly here, 
we know from Doe that the New Jersey Constitution gives 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants the right to be free from Tier 
2 and Tier 3 notification absent a showing of an overriding 
state interest. The New Jersey Supreme Court there held 
not only that Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants had a right to the 
procedural due process guaranteed by the New Jersey 
Constitution, but also that they had a substantive right 
under that Constitution to be free of the disclosures 
required by Megan's Law, absent a demonstration that 
such disclosures are required by a legitimate and 
substantial state interest.26 As the court explained: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Compare Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1834 (1996) (holding that state statutes 
which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular 
substantive result do not give rise to a state-created "liberty interest"). 
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With its declaration of the right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness, Article I, § 1 of the New Jersey 
Constitution encompasses the right of privacy. . . . We 
have found a constitutional right of privacy in many 
contexts, including the disclosure of confidential or 
personal information. Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point 
Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 96, 609 A.2d 11 (1992) (citing In 
re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 447 A.2d 1290 (1982)). 
 
In resolving conflicts between the government's need 
for information and the individual's right of 
confidentiality, this Court has adopted a balancing test 
similar to that adopted by the federal courts. Martin, 
supra, 90 N.J. at 318, 447 A.2d 1290. We concluded, in 
Martin, that " `even if the governmental purpose is 
legitimate and substantial . . . the invasion of the 
fundamental right of privacy must be minimized by 
utilizing the narrowest means which can be designed to 
achieve the public purpose.' " Ibid. (quoting Lehrhaupt 
v. Flynn, 140 N.J.Super. 250, 262, 264, 356 A.2d 35 
(App.Div. 1976), aff'd o.b., 75 N.J. 459, 383 A.2d 428 
(1978)). . . . 
 
662 A.2d at 412.27 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. While it is clear that deprivation of a state created liberty interest 
triggers due process protection, and that a state created right to be free 
of physical restraint is such an interest, the scope of the phrase "liberty 
interest" as used in the context of the Due Process Clause has not been 
fully delineated. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09 (observing that 
deprivation of a state law right to obtain liquor in anonymity when 
combined with the stigma of defamation would implicate a state-created 
"liberty interest," while the stigma alone would not do so). The phrase 
"property interest" in this context has been broadly construed, however, 
to include contract rights, choses-in-action, and a right to state created 
benefits. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 
(1985) (legal and equitable claims); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1978) (utility service); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 574 (1975) (school attendance); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
602 (1972) (employment contract). Indeed, "property interest" has been 
interpreted so as to extend procedural due process protection to virtually 
all rights that states will enforce in a court of law. With this background, 
we believe that the Supreme Court would interpret"liberty interest" in 
the context of the Due Process Clause to include a state created right to 
privacy like that recognized in Doe. 
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B. Standards For Determining The Process Due  
 
Having concluded that Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants are 
entitled to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution, we turn to the issue of what 
process is due them. Appellants contend that two 
procedural protections are due that are absent from the 
Megan's Law scheme. They insist that due process requires 
both that the burden of persuasion at a Megan's Law 
hearing be on the state rather than the registrant, and that 
the state's burden at such a hearing be to demonstrate the 
propriety of the tier classification and the notification plan 
by clear and convincing evidence.28 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28.  As we have noted, appellants also argue that the notice of a 
proposed notification cannot be dispensed with in emergency situations 
as the Supreme Court of New Jersey has suggested. We decline to 
address that issue for the same reason that we declined to do so in 
Artway--it is unripe. 81 F.3d at 1252; see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 
U.S. 136 (1967). "The right to notice is not absolute;" instead, due 
process provides for a right to " `reasonably calculated' notice." Artway, 
81 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). "[T]he State cannot dispense with notice when 
that notice is possible and irreparable harm could result." 81 F.3d at 
1252; see United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
The Megan's Law standard for dispensing with notice, as articulated in 
Doe and the Guidelines, involves cases where it is "impossible as a 
practical matter" to give notice or to do so in a timely manner. 662 A.2d 
at 382; Guidelines at 17. None of the representative plaintiffs asserts 
that his notification issued absent notice; nor is there anything in the 
record indicating that New Jersey's prosecutors have ever dispensed with 
notice or plan to do so. The only indication we have as to what 
circumstances would meet the standard is the suggestion in the 
Guidelines that a prosecutor may apply for a court order to effect 
notification absent notice where she does not receive notice of the release 
of a sex offender until after the date of release or she can demonstrate 
that she made "every good faith effort" to serve a registrant who merely 
avoided service. Guidelines at 17-18. As in Artway, we simply do not 
have the necessary "factual matrix" against which to evaluate this 
standard. 81 F.3d at 1252. 
 
There is another consideration which, as it did in Artway, would 
prevent us from reaching the notice issue here--the Pullman abstention 
doctrine. Id. at 1252 n.12; see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 
 
                                56 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the 
framework we must apply to analyze both the burden of 
persuasion claim--whether it is the state or the registrant 
who must persuade the court on the material points--and 
the standard of proof claim--whether, if the burden of 
persuasion is on the state, the state must prove its case by 
a preponderance or by clear and convincing evidence. As 
Mathews teaches: 
 
[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). .. . 
 
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that 
identification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct 
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
 
The Supreme Court has twice applied the Mathews  test 
in the specific context of a challenge to the preponderance 
of evidence standard of proof. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745 (1982), posed the issue of whether due process 
requires the state to prove its case in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding by clear and convincing 
evidence, rather than merely by a preponderance of 
evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 
presented the issue of the state's burden in a civil 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
496 (1941). The New Jersey courts have yet to interpret the "impossible 
as a practical matter" standard, and "[t]o the extent state court 
interpretation would make the standard comport with due process, 
abstention would probably be appropriate even if the issue were ripe." 81 
F.3d at 1252 n.12. 
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commitment proceeding. In each instance, the Court, in 
addition to identifying the private and public interests at 
stake and evaluating the relative risk of error in the 
particular kinds of proceedings involved, addressed whether 
the standard employed "fairly allocates the risk of an 
erroneous factfinding between the[ ] parties." Santosky, 455 
U.S. at 761. As the Santosky Court explained: 
 
Addington teaches that, in any given proceeding, the 
minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due 
process requirement reflects not only the weight of the 
private and public interests affected, but also a societal 
judgment about how the risk of error should be 
distributed between the litigants. 
 
Id. at 755. 
 
In both Santosky and Addington, the Court held that due 
process required the state to carry the burden of 
persuasion by more than a preponderance of the evidence, 
since the preponderance standard requires litigants to 
"share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion." 
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. Neither a person threatened 
with a termination of parental rights nor one standing in 
jeopardy of a civil commitment "should . . . be asked to 
share equally with society the risk of error when the 
possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than 
any possible harm to the state." Id. at 427. 
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